Since 2008, the West has experienced turbulent times. The financial crisis, the European debt crisis, and the explosion of social media have jeopardized the political balance of the postwar period, and even, according to many analysts, liberal democracy itself. Doubtless, we are living through the dissolution of the relative political and economic stability that has existed since the end of the Cold War.
To that must be added the appearance of non-Western powers and the consolidation of China as a political-economic force, all of which increases the destabilization of the planet by disputing the hegemonic role of the United States, which it adopted after World War II.
This has led to liberal democracy being threatened in various countries —both developed and undeveloped— which today face the tense situation of the rise and emergence of populist leaders and movements. The term “populism”, although used in different ways, has therefore become extremely popular. Despite being used often as a synonym for demagogy,[1] populism is better identified as a political tendency or logic that tends to separate the elite —the establishment—as a homogenous and corrupt group, from the people, which is viewed in turn as a homogenous and pure group. There are thus two antagonistic groups: one the people, and the other, the anti-people. This moralizing and anti-establishment tendency can be represented just as well by one leader as by a movement or party, but the crucial thing is that it divides the world into good guys and bad guys, presenting populists as the good redeemers, who embody the voice and the needs of the people.
Populism is also defined as a thin ideology, because it can “fit into” another, thick ideology, whether fascism, socialism or liberalism, all of which feature comprehensive ideologies of society. One can therefore find populist movements or leaders as much on the right as on the left.[2]
Democracy, “Government by the people,” carries the adjective “liberal” when it has certain characteristics, among which we might highlight the separation of powers (legislative, judicial and executive), and the protection of the rights and liberties of individuals by means of legislation, which generally takes the form of a constitution. This whole separation of powers and mutual checks is based on one of liberalism’s most important premises: that men are not angels, and can put power to bad ends. However, as Roberto Torretti points out, these worries originated a very long time ago, in Greek democracy, where “various aspects of Athenian democratic institutions seem to have been inspired by the fear that an individual would distinguish himself too greatly, gain influence, and seize power”.[3] Later, it was Montesquieu who, “to protect individuals from the supremacy of the State… advocated the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers”,[4] preparing the intellectual way for the Founding Fathers of the United States to create the basis of liberal democracy, which would later extend through almost the entire Western world. Those institutional pillars are the opposite of populism, which is no friend to limits on power, or to the idea that the “will of the people” ought to be questioned when it is expressed by majorities. Roger Scruton explains —as illustrated in the infographic —that our nature leads us to seek strong leaders, and follow them blindly, because that is how it behooved us to act for thousands of years. Whoever didn’t follow the leader, the strong man who could keep everyone safe, simply died, or his tribe disappeared.[5] Our condition as Homo sapiens is extremely novel, if we consider the evolutionary history of our human species.[6] To control these deeper animal instincts, or rather, moderate them, is the task of culture and civilization. Jonathan Haidt points out that “human beings are tribal creatures without too much intelligence at the individual level” and “only when you manage to create good systems of social organization can you correct our failings and get good results”.[7] The “threat of tribalism”, as Amy Chua and Jed Rubenfeld titled their essay in The Atlantic, is always present.[8]
Although many speak about the supposed error of Francis Fukuyama in having proclaimed the consolidation of liberal democracy as an ideological success —he called it “the end of history”—the idea, usually attributed to Winston Churchill, that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others which have been tried”, is still true. Wars, democratic retreats or the de facto threats of global leadership, like regimes of the China type, do not contradict the superiority of liberal democracy as a method of government for those who value liberty and humanism.[9] The unfortunate democratic retreats of recent years have occurred not only in the West, but also in the East, where liberal democracy has been gaining ground for years. Amartya Sen, in a recent interview with the New Yorker, stated that there are still democratic elements in India, but if one asked him “has democracy declined since ten or fifteen or twenty years ago?” the answer would be yes.[10] Illiberal aspects, introduced to democracies like India, come via changes or forced interpretations of the constitution— like Evo Morales did to run for reelection despite being explicitly denied by the people in a plebiscite—[11] and even modifications to supreme courts and the intimidation and censure of the press. False redeemers arise and receive the support of voters, generally in times of crisis. And if there is no such crisis, things are arranged so as to create the sensation that we are living through one, a political operation all the easier today due to the appearance of social media and how attractive it is for human beings to believe we live in catastrophic times.
However, there is a moderately positive interpretation of populism in the works of Margaret Canova, who focusses on consolidated democracies,[12] and in the works of the Argentine marxist Ernesto Laclau and his partner, the Belgian Chantal Mouffe.[13] This current argues in part that populist movements, despite everything, serve to make politicians and elites attend to the real needs of citizens, needs they had let fall by the wayside due either to blindness or corruption. Populism could function, therefore, as democracy’s corrective. This interpretation is confused, due to the fact that any leader, event, or popular movement that questions the actually bad acts of politicians —or even betters the conditions of previously forgotten groups— could be called “populist”. It doesn’t differentiate reformists from populists. Basically, one can define populism in too many ways, from too many currents in the social sciences, from the sociological[14] and political,[15] to the economic,[16] among others,[17] and theorize from there, as it is a stipulative definition. For example, if one considers that populisms are simply redistributive policies or, why not, pro-sports policies, the conflict with liberal democracy is over. This would be an endless argument, but the academic literature and public opinion have converged on the idea that populism is a movement contrary in its essence to liberal democracy, as it is majoritarian—against minorities, checks and balances, and pluralism— and moralizes society between good people and bad people in a Manichaean fashion. This last quality, besides opposing liberal democracies, vulgarizes and radicalizes political deliberation, which has entered an intolerance spiral rarely seen in recent years, and one which even worries the universities, where tolerance ought to be essential, as Harald Beyer explains well in his essay for this edition of ÁTOMO.[18]
While there are authors like Morris Fiorina who hold that, in addition to being nothing new in our history, this political polarization is only found among elites, which allows us to hope that voters will be more moderate,[19] the ascendency of populist leaders in European countries (as Paulina Astroza analyzes in her essay for this publication) and Donald Trump’s rise to power, give us reason enough to worry. Populisms present challenges for democracies, especially if the West wants to remain united in representing and advocating for humanist values that have been so forgotten by the new Eastern powers. This number of ÁTOMO is therefore dedicated to reflecting on these issues, in addition to the usual articles on books, fiction, poetry and music.
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[1] An interesting analysis in this direction is made by Delsol, C. (2015). Populismos: una defensa de la indefendible. Argentina: Ariel.
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[2] For an analysis of the term, see: Mudde, C. y Rovira, C. (2019). Populismo. Una breve introducción. Alianza Editorial, S.A., Madrid. There are discrepancies regarding what an ideology is, and more specifically a thin ideology, and there are those, like Ernesto Laclau, who say that populism is not an ideology. See his essay “Populismo: Qué nos dice el nombre” in Panizza, F. (2009). El populismo como espejo de la democracia. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2009; Another rigorous analysis has been done by Aslanidis, P. (2016). “Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective”. Political Studies, 64(1 suppl), 88-104. Regarding the term “thin ideology” see Freeden, M. (2003). Ideology: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press. Chapter 7.
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[3] Torreti, R. (2019). “Democracia”. Hitos de la historia de una palabra. Editorial Universidad Diego Portales. Page 20.
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[4] Ibid. Page 36.
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[5] Scruton, R. (2018) [2010]. Las Bondades del pesimismo. Y el peligro de la falsa esperanza. Fundación para el Progreso.
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[6] Harari, Y. N. (2014). Sapiens. De animales a dioses: Una breve historia de la humanidad. Debate.
[7] Haidt, J. (2018). “Bienvenida la diversidad (menos la intelectual)”. Entrevista en Revista ÁTOMO, Primavera.
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[8] Chua, A. y Rubenfeld, J. (2018). “The Threat of Tribalism”. The Atlantic. October. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/the-threat-of-tribalism/568342/
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[9] Fukuyama said in 2006 that many critics “have simply based themselves on erroneous interpretations of what I meant to say, like for example those who believe I think that certain events are going to stop happening. It is not my intention to address these kinds of criticisms here, which could for the most part have been avoided if the person in question had read the book.”. Fukuyama, F. (2006). “Epílogo a la segunda edición en rústica de El Fin de la Historia y el último hombre”, en Fukuyama, F. (2015). El Fin de la Historia y otros ensayos. Alianza Editorial.
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[10] Sen, A. (2019). “Amartya Sen’s Hopes and Fears for Indian Democracy”. Interview in the New Yorker of 6 October 2019. Available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-new-yorker-interview/amartya-sens-hopes-and-fears-for-indian-democracy
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[11] Evo Morales, among various illiberal assaults on Bolivian democracy, modified the way judges are chosen in his favor through a new constitution, and after ascertaining that he could not be reelected, called for a plebiscite to reform his own constitution. The people voted no, but nevertheless Morales ran again for reelection, basing himself on a dubious interpretation of the constitution that “guaranteed his right to present himself as a candidate,” proposed by the judges that he himself had nominated.
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[12] Although she does more descriptive work, one can deduce, although not with total certainty, that she has a positive opinion of populism. She bases her ideas on those of of Michael Oakeshott, who differentiated between what he calls “the politics of faith” and “the politics of skepticism”, qualifying modern democracy as a neccessary intersection between the politics of “redemptive” faith and “pragmatic” skepticism,. In this context populism would be a third vector borne out of the constant tension between both, or when the representative element becomes substantially out of touch with those represented. See Canovan, M. (1999). “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy”. Political studies, 47(1), 2-16.
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[13] For example, the recent work of the Chilean Camila Vergara defends and redefines populism. She starts from a historical materialist perspective and describes Juan Domingo Perón as a populist leader for “incorporating the working classes in the political system and bettering their socioeconomic condition.” —a definition by which almost all Chilean governments would be populists— through state reforms. She describes Fujimori as a neo-populist for his liberal reforms that “impoverished the lower classes and created a discriminatory state contrary to the popular vote and the distribution of of wealth.” Chávez, too, she names a populist, for his reforms with a strong state that “reduced poverty by 40%, achieving one of the lowest levels of inequality in the region, and creating a network of 45,000 self-governing communities.” See Vergara, C. (2019). “Populism as Plebeian Politics: Inequality, Domination, and Popular Empowerment”. The Journal of Political Philosophy.
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[14] For example, see, Germani, G. (1978). Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
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[15] Among many developments, one can consult the work of Weyland, Kurt. 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics”. Comparative Politics 34(1): 1–22. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/422412; and Laclau, E. (2005). La razón populista. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
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[16] Dornbusch, R. y Edwards, S. (Eds). (1991). The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226158488.001.0001.
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[17] For a detailed review of the several currents, see Rovira, C. and Hawkins, K.A. (2019). “The ideational approach” in Kirk A. Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. The Ideational Approach to Populism. New York: Routledge, 2019.
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[18] See, for example, Haidt, J. and Lukianoff, G. (2019). Malcriando a los jóvenes estadounidenses. Cómo las buenas intenciones y malas ideas están preparando a una generación para el fracaso. Fundación para el Progreso. See also Horwitz, S. (2015). “Cooperation over coercion: The importance of unsupervised childhood play for democracy and liberalism”. Cosmos+Taxis, 3-16.
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[19] Fiorina, M. (2019). Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting, and Political Stalemate. Hoover Institution Press Publication.
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